Flightmed archive for October-2002

Flightmed archive for October-2002
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Re: Cockpit Curtain Feedback
- From: "Robert L. Carnevale" <cw5aso@erols.com>
- Date: Thu, 03 Oct 2002 23:47:34 -0400
I've worked in aviation long enough (29 years) to personnally experience and witness the pressures that get generated (real or imagined) when a decision has to be made and the weather is less than optimal. Keeping emotions out of the decision is the only smart way to conduct this buisness. I know of people who have died because emotions clouded their judgement. We all probably know of someone. It isn't necessary to know anything about the patient before making the decision on if you can launch on a flight. That decision is cut and dried. Do you meet all of the requirements to launch and complete the flight. It doesn't matter what you find
out after this decision is made.
Most medevac programs (helicopter) don't have the weather issues you've mentioned. They check the weather for the entire mission. If they have the weather, great. If not, the decision would be no we can't accept the mission as requested. Sometimes an alternate plan can be developed like, if the requesting facility can wait 1 hour, then we will have the weather to complete the mission. Why would you launch on a flight to pick up a patient and not know if you had the weather at the ultimate patient destination? Even if your IFR, you planning weather had to be good enough to reach your destination or alternate. If there was a possibility that
you might miss at the destination, and would have to fly to the alternate, this should have been discussed before you ever took off with your crew. Again, this is upfront decision making without the emotions.
Bob Carnevale
Pilot
Safety Program Manager
Ken Lawson-Williams wrote:
> Received the following off-line from a ATPL medevac (fixed wing) captain with lots of previous bush flying time and thought it worth sharing. Some very good points I thought. By the way he apparently got his moose last days off so I’m not sure why he is moaning...
>
> “The concept of separation might look good on paper, and have some validity to it, but is more fiction than reality. It can help on launch, but do you really think that when we help load the patient we can't tell if the patient is critical or unstable? Get real – we are not stupid. And you don't mention having that same briefing after arriving at the patient to decide if it is safe to take off to go back to base again? So what gives?
>
> If you want this to work it has to be for EVERY flight, not just the initial leg to reach the patient. Once you are almost ready to return to the airport, you would have to call us to confirm that the weather at our destination hospital and alternate is still safe to fly. If it isn't safe at the destination, then we will advise you and we can then discuss alternate destinations/alternate pairs. But when you arrive back at the airport, I highly doubt that your intent, pressure free decision making, will be met by a discussion during loading.
>
> And when you request a “MEDEVAC” clearance from ATC don't you think that might just clue us in to the situation? Especially since most of you hardly ever request it. Or what about when you specifically request a low cabin and we have to refile? Don't you think that tells us something about the respiratory status of the patient? Or when we see all hell breaking loose back there and the kit's getting trashed – you think that MAYBE we might just pick up on it? For most of you guys, frenzied activity is highly unusual. When we see that it kind of tells us something about the patient – no matter how calm you guys try to project yourselves to be.
>
> Why do you think the government health types wants us to use MEDEVAC on EVERY flight, loaded or not, critical or not? It's against all the regs but they think that when ATC gets a request for MEDEVAC clearance, they have the same tendency to shave corners and max out the envelope that you want to try to reduce in Pilots! The Transportation Safety Board has even come out with that in some of their investigations as a primary reason for the incident! Even those 'experts' can't decide how to solve this problem – in one sentence moaning about inappropriate use of MEDEVAC designations, in the next attributing the incident to it's use! Committees...
>
> Maybe what we really need is new reg's, and an industry wide consensus on how to operate. God knows I am the last to suggest endless meetings and studies, but I have yet to see even one up here into this area – despite the accident rate – that actually met with the pilots, let alone you guys in the back. It always seems to be regulators, lawyers, and reps from the government health agencies that pay the bills. Talk about having their heads screwed on backwards.
>
> I think you should try to get this solved another way – Once all of us Line types agree on how we think it can be made to work safely, then you can have the human factors types analyse and tweak it, THEN get the regulators to incorporate it. But I'm not going to put off any hunting trips waiting for it to happen, I'd starve first!”
>
> Fly Safe.
> Ken L-W CCEMT-P/WMT
>
> Duct tape is like the force, it has a light side and a dark side, and it holds the universe together.
>
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